IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND 2 3 4 MDL NO. 13-2472-PAS 5 IN RE: LOESTRIN 24 Fe JUNE 26, 2018 6 ANTITRUST LITIGATION 7 8 PROVIDENCE, RI 9 10 BEFORE THE HONORABLE PATRICIA A. SULLIVAN 11 12 MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 (Telephone Conference) 14 15 16 APPEARANCES: 17 FOR THE END-PAYOR CLASS DONNA M. EVANS, ESQ. PLAINTIFFS: Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll 18 (via telephone) 88 Pine Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10005 19 MICHELLE C. ZOLNOSKI, ESQ. 20 Motley Rice 600 Third Avenue 21 New York, NY 10016 22 FOR THE CVS and RITE AID ERIC L. BLOOM, ESQ. Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin PLAINTIFFS: 23 & Schiller (via telephone) 4400 Deer Path Road 24 Suite 200 Harrisburg, PA 17110 25

1	FOR THE WARNER CHILCOTT AND WATSON DEFENDANTS:	KATHERINE DYSON, ESQ. JULIAN CANZONERI, ESQ.	
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26 JUNE 2018 -- 2:06 P.M.

THE COURT: Motion of the Plaintiffs for production of documents, focusing on documents withheld and instead listed on the privilege log. The motion -- I'm actually looking at a copy where I can't read the ECF number and so I'm not sure what it is; however, Ms. Saucier may clue me in in a minute. It's obliterated because the sealing ends up putting the ECF number so that I can't read it.

Probably the most material thing that I've now, I hope, correctly focused on is that what is now in issue is 29 so-called business communications, communications among various business individuals. Twenty-nine is a reasonably-sized set, and so I want to discuss with the parties whether it makes sense at this point to step to an *in camera* inspection of that set of 29, unless 29 really understates the volume and is actually nine boxes of material, in which case I'd like to discuss something less than all of them.

And then, second, we have 196 marketing consultant communications. My understanding is that those are principally -- although the Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Hara left Warner Chilcott and was therefore no longer functioning as counsel, yet there are documents logged after she ceased to be counsel. But my

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impression is that that set essentially consists of her communications, what the Defendants allege is legal advice being provided to certain marketing consultants because Warner Chilcott didn't have an in-house department performing those functions. impression is that the Defendants are asserting what appears to be in the nature of a functional equivalence argument. 129-96 (sic) is a lot, so my hope would be that this call would yield an approach to a sampling, perhaps three to be chosen by each side so that we can get to the bottom of whether or not examination of the actual communications reveals that these are truly in their essence the conveying of legal advice which happens to be going to a consultant because the consultant is fulfilling a role that otherwise would have been played by an employee, but the company hadn't built out that department.

So the goal is to discuss what that approach should be, including -- in some instances when I've done in camera review, if the business communications/legal communications topics are sufficiently obscure, that a very minimal explanation is required to permit the party submitting the documents for in camera review to provide a written explanation, with the ability to redact such portions

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of the written explanation as actually reveal the attorney-client content so that I'm not totally befuddled by the use of words and phrases that I don't understand.

So with that, I'd like to have the people who are on the line just identify yourselves quickly. We'll go through who is on the line, who is the spokesperson for Plaintiffs on this motion, who is the spokesperson for the Watson and Warner Defendants, and then we can figure out how to move forward to, I hope, a prompt resolution of the challenge raised by the motion.

So if people could clearly and distinctly say who you are and who you represent, and I realize people have to scream and whoever gets heard gets recorded. Go ahead, Plaintiff.

MS. EVANS: Your Honor, you have Donna Evans for the End-Payor Plaintiffs but on this call representing all of the Plaintiffs.

> I'm sorry, say your name again. THE COURT:

MS. EVANS: Donna Evans.

THE COURT: Ah, Ms. Evans. Okay.

MS. EVANS: For the End-Payor Plaintiffs but speaking for all of the Plaintiffs. And I will, after everyone has introduced themselves, want to address the

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number of documents that you referenced.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              All right. Anyone else for the End-Payors?
              MS. ZOLNOSKI: Yes.
                                    Michelle Zolnoski of Motley
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      Rice, LLC on behalf of the End-Payor Plaintiffs.
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                         Anybody else for End-Payors?
              THE COURT:
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              How about Direct Plaintiffs?
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              (No response)
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              THE COURT: Sounds like you're carrying
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      everyone's water, Ms. Evans.
              Do we have anyone on the line for the Retailers?
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                          Your Honor, this is Eric Bloom from
              MR. BLOOM:
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      Hangley Aronchick on behalf of CVS and the Rite Aid
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       Plaintiffs.
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              THE COURT:
                          Good afternoon.
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              Anyone else for any Plaintiffs?
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              (No response)
              THE COURT: And on the Defendants' side?
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              MS. DYSON:
                          This is Kate Dyson for the Warner
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       and Watson Defendants, your Honor.
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                          All righty. Anybody else?
              THE COURT:
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              (No response)
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              (Unintelligible)
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              THE COURT: I'm sorry, I missed that.
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MR. CANZONERI: Julian Canzoneri for the Warner and Watson Defendants.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

All right. I'm not hearing any other people introducing themselves.

So I think I would like to start then,

Ms. Evans, with first of all a correction, if there is
a correction, of my understanding of the scope of what
we're dealing with.

MS. EVANS: Yes, your Honor. There are 29 business communications, as we call them, entries that we are challenging. But in addition to that, we are challenging their family members. There are to our best count 63 family members, and so the total for that group would be somewhat tighter than you mentioned. I think that approximates about 92, if I've got my math right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. EVANS: So you've got the parents and then their family members that drop down from that.

With respect to -- the same is true with respect to the marketing advisers. Two things I'd like to mention there. One, there are 13 separate marketing advisers, so they're in 13 individual groups, and we can talk more about that in a moment, but I just wanted

to clarify that it's not a list of 196 related to any one particular marketing adviser. So they all, you know, may have some different role, I don't know.

In addition to that there are, among those 196 parent entries, an attendant 241 family members (unintelligible). That's 196 parents, 241 family members, which is a total of 437 entries in all. We did not include the family members because we felt that it was easier for the Court to see the parents' entries only without volumes and volumes of paper.

THE COURT: I appreciate that.

Ms. Evans, from your perspective, let me just sort of throw an idea up on the wall and then you can react. If your view that the parent communication is sufficient for the purpose of meaningful in camera review, does it make sense for it to be the 29 parents in the business communication category, and then the fact that you've got 13 advisers; I wonder if that means that the Plaintiffs get to designate let's say 20, and the Defendants, who of course know the content, can designate a different 20, so that I would be looking at a total of 40 parents in the marketing category. I'm thinking of 20. That's more than I wanted to look at frankly, but with 13 different advisers it's possible that the nature of the

communication with one adviser might be crisply and clearly an attorney-client communication and another very different. So it might change adviser by adviser, so I would want the Plaintiffs to be allowed to designate. And then you would get to choose what you want to do with your 20, you know, what you think is going to give me the best array to make a judgment.

Does that make sense from the Plaintiffs' perspective?

MS. EVANS: Yes and no. I guess as to the yes part that may make sense on the marketing consultants which I'll (unintelligible) in just a moment. But I will mention as to family members in both categories, the family members will not automatically be privileged or non-privileged based on the parent.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. EVANS: For example, you may have a parent -- well, first off, you know, it's obvious you may have a memo that says or sends some other document with financial information in the business documents that should be only redacted. So just to clarify, what I wouldn't want to happen is whether documents get produced or not depends solely on that analysis of say 29 or three or six business parent members. I'm trying to think of the best way to resolve that. It might be

that three family members as well, but I don't want to overload you. That would end up being approximately six and six per party, perhaps. But that's my concern about family members. Otherwise, I think it might make sense.

The only other thing that I would add about the in camera review -- well, two things. One, it might be helpful if Defendants would highlight for you what they think is privileged about them so that it might help you to distinguish between is there any information that could become privileged if you're looking at it.

The second, I'll also say what I think I'm hearing what you're saying, which is that you're looking as far as deposition -- I'm sorry -- declarations, but not requiring any engagement agreements, and I'm just, you know --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, your words just got muddled on that sentence. You said I'm looking at the declaration but...

MS. EVANS: But as I understand it you're not asking for any further information, including engagement agreements or anything else that might enlighten what's going on (unintelligible). You know, our view would be, without getting into argument, that Ms. Hara's declarations doesn't particularly describe

any particular relationship that would create an exception to what is now a non-privileged document based on sharing with third parties.

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So as I understand what you're saying is you're going directly into *in camera* review at this point.

THE COURT: Yes, I think I want to go directly to in camera review and to have -- I mean, for example, if Ms. Hara is saying thank you for the draft of the ad, my legal advice is that the first sentence is defamatory and should be altered, my legal advice is further that the second sentence is contrary to CFR blah blah blah, if you have any questions about my legal advice please call me, best regards, Attorney And I mean that just screams that this is an Hara. attorney-client privilege to a marketing consultant who is serving as the marketing arm of the company. Ι don't think I need to spend three weeks worrying about finding all the engagement letters. And if that's the communication, if it's muddy, then maybe more information would be required.

What I like to do, which has worked well in other situations, is to have the Defendants file a supplemental, very tight, very short document by document memorandum in which they explain to me why this is privileged. And often when they're really

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privileged it's really clear, it's really easy. And if that supplemental very short, tight document-specific memorandum necessarily and it will contain privileged information itself, then what I am telling the Defendants to do is to file that document, to redact it so that the Plaintiffs can't see the portion of the filing that says in my hypothetical case Ms. Hara is obviously providing legal advice to the ABC advertising agency, that sentence. Well, actually that sentence probably gets redacted, but if there's more discussion of what's in the sentence it would get redacted. then if the Defendants say that the ABC advertising agency, you know, did prepare all Warner Watson advertisements from, you know, during Ms. Hara's time as counsel for the company, then I think we can -that's pretty simple. I don't think we need to spend layers and layers of time to get to the bottom of it.

If the Plaintiffs, if what I see inside the documents is ambiguous and I can't figure out whether this is really privileged or not without knowing dates of engagement and all that sort of detailed stuff, I'll ask for more information.

But it seems to me this stuff is going to fall into one of three categories: Plainly not privileged, crisply and clearly privileged, muddy as heck, and if

it's muddy as heck, then I may ask for more information.

MS. EVANS: Okay. And your Honor, very respectfully, Plaintiffs do not agree that Ms. Hara providing legal advice to a third party is the test for an exception. In fact we think that turns the exception on its head. The test is that it would have to be applied to be advice given to the client, which is Warner Chilcott's marketing department, has to be legal advice and that the third party has to be somehow facilitating that legal advice, none of which we think she's shown in her declarations. But we took the test step, and that's why I asked about an agreement, if not met.

THE COURT: Right. Well, if I'm understanding -- and I'm sure Ms. Dyson is going to help us with this in a minute.

If I'm understanding the position that Ms. Hara is taking, she is the legal adviser to the marketing department at Warner Chilcott. Actually let's see if she was Watson, yes -- no; Warner Chilcott, and that Warner Chilcott didn't hire employees for marketing, it used an outside vendor. So this isn't analogous to what's in most of the cases where the attorney is communicating with the client and then the third party

is in the mix and the analysis of the court is why is that third party in the mix. If the third party is a, you know, a language interpreter and the attorney doesn't speak the client's language, we don't spend any time on that. That's plainly absolutely necessary.

That's not what we're dealing with here. This is different, and I think that the term that's been used in the cases is functional equivalent.

So I understand that the Plaintiffs are challenging that. I want to see what the communications look like, and then I'll figure out whether the communications are so clearly functionally equivalent that I can rule, or they're not, in which case I need more information.

MS. EVANS: Your Honor, one of our concerns is, and I think we gave you the Lynx case, L-y-n-x, --

THE COURT: Yes. Actually I just read Lynx about half an hour ago.

MS. EVANS: All right. The fact that says that the functional equivalent is not recognized in the First Circuit as a basis for the exception to third party waiver, so I just wanted to supply that for you. And based on that, we don't think even if the functional equivalent might establish, which we don't think it's met, they did have a marketing department,

and she says in her declaration that they were sort of staffing marketing. But you will see on the actual entries that there are marketing people inside Warner Chilcott working at Warner Chilcott.

So we both don't think that the function at this point has been met, but we also see that the First Circuit has not recognized that as a basis for an exception to third party waiver, again, through our additional concerns.

THE COURT: Well, I think Judge O'Toole is not saying that functional equivalent has been rejected in the First Circuit. It simply says, as so many things when your circuit is so tiny like ours, it just hasn't been specifically adopted. And I think his analysis is that he observes that it hasn't been adopted or applied, but then he goes on and does the analysis and finds that what was presented in the case that he was looking at didn't hit, so therefore he found that the communications were, the involvement of the third party amounted to a waiver, and that was the basis for the ruling. So --

MS. EVANS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- yes, I'm with you. I just don't foreclose the possibility that an entity can use a third party to perform a function and have

attorney-client communications conveyed not via the client with the third party listening in, which is which most of these cases are, but directly to the third party acting as an alter ego of the client. I think that's a possibility, and I think the communications will tell me if that's what I'm looking at or not.

MS. EVANS: One thing that I might also add. She says in her declaration that she does this communication via the third party in order to convey legal information to the client, so clearly the client marketing department is there, and our view is that if that attorney to client communication for purposes of legal advice that protected but not giving information to say, yes, you need to remove that from the top of your title in this marketing document, would not be the kind of third party protected information.

And if I might point you to what we did not cite to in our brief, but there is a District of

New Hampshire case called Flagstaff (sic) in which a bank gives the information to a marketing consultant, and the court (unintelligible) analysis in the First Circuit. So this is not privileged, (unintelligible) virtually very similar if not exact circumstances to this.

THE COURT: Do you have a citation for that case?

MS. EVANS: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: The Flagstaff case, do you have a citation?

MS. EVANS: Yes, I do. It's 2009 Westlaw, so 2009 WL 3756898.

THE COURT: 6898. Okay.

MS. EVANS: Sorry.

THE COURT: That sounds like something I should definitely take a look at.

So Ms. Evans, I want to hear from the Defendants so let me kind of wrap up here. It sounds like the Plaintiffs, I mean I don't want to go down a long and time-consuming and expensive path of having a little mini trial on the nature of each of 13 consultants. It feels to me like that may be the horse and the substance of the communications may be the cart, but I think the cart is going to tell us whether it's worth engaging in an effort like that. And that's why I want to jump -- to not have mini trials on who are the 13 advisers but, rather, go to an *in camera* review. I am not unmindful of the arguments that you're making, and I'm going to go add that Flagstaff case to my pile of reading material and will be very conscious that if the

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communications end up being as you're describing, that is, in-house attorney to in-house employees with the marketing consultant participating in the communication and not particularly, you know, not necessary in the way that the case has described necessity, so that we're really in the more traditional third-party waiver category, then I'm going to say it's waived, if that's what they look like. But I'm going to see what they look like, and what I'd like to do is limit that look to 20 to be designated. And the Defendants can rest on what the -- so the Defendants don't have to add more to the pile unless they want to. I just want to give them the option, if they feel that the Plaintiffs' 20 are not a fair representation of the nature of the communications, that you can have up to 20 more. just as soon get less. And what I'd like is for the Defendants' submission to include with each document a picture of the log entry for the document, and then the Defendants' would have the opportunity, if they want, to provide me with document specific, tightly worded, not a lot, argument about why the document that I'm looking at is covered by a privilege and is appropriately logged.

I'm not sure exactly what I'm now asking for, but I think this whole business of the parents and the

families, what I would ask simply is that in making the presentation to me you are crystal clear in what's a family member that's been withheld, what's a family member that's not been withheld or redacted, or however the family members are nuanced, so that I understand very clearly what I'm looking at.

Anything else, Ms. Evans, that you'd like to bring to my attention before I turn to the Defendants?

MS. EVANS: A couple of quick questions, your Honor. Thank you. One, would it be possible or would it be helpful, I think is the better way to ask it, to you if the Plaintiffs can provide you with a picture of the 20 entries that they're challenging for purposes of the *in camera* review, to provide a single sentence as to why we are challenging it?

THE COURT: Absolutely. I think that would be helpful. So that would basically be a supplemental submission by you on the documents that are actually going to be the subject of the *in camera* review.

MS. EVANS: And the 20 that we're talking about now are the marketing advisers; correct?

THE COURT: Correct. What I'm contemplating, although your 53 family members are sounding intimidating, so maybe we can do a sampling. Do you think, Ms. Evans, that a sampling of the business

communications would be an effective device?

My sense was this marketing set are going to have some similarity and therefore a sampling makes sense and can result in a ruling that applies to the entire tranche, but that the business communications are really going to turn on the individualized content of the document as to whether it's actually dealing exclusively with the conveyance of legal advice among a -- as I understand it, we've got business people communicating with each other. You know, there might be an attorney on the list, but it's business-to-business people, but the content is the conveyance of legal advice and that's why the privilege has been invoked.

So it feels to me like you kind of need to look at each one. Do you have any more efficient suggestions?

MS. EVANS: Maybe the four that we talked about -- you were planning to look at the 29. If we left that intact, if you did look at that, perhaps we'd try to give you half a dozen or 10 at most family members, but maybe we could limit it to, you know, to half, six, and that would give you a feel for the family members as well. And if in your view of that selection from both sides you see a significant number

of documents that you think need to be redacted or are 2 not privileged then you may go further; but maybe as 3 the first step you get a good feel for the 29 parents 4 and, you know, combined, a dozen family members, and

that way you have a good sense of the document.

Okay. All right. That sounds like THE COURT: a viable, potentially viable suggestion.

> All right. Let's hear from Ms. Dyson.

Good afternoon, your Honor. This is MS. DYSON: Kate Dyson.

> THE COURT: Hello.

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MS. DYSON: Hello. We are certainly happy to go along with the Court's proposal. I would say that I think we can probably tighten it up a bit for your Honor, as we pointed out in our response brief.

For the marketing communications, a number of the challenged entries are iterations of e-mail chains where, you know, there are two distinct sections that are redacted. For example, in each iteration of the chain, and there're maybe 15 of, you know, these e-mail exchanges going back and forth, so I think that we may well be able to shrink of size of that. And similarly, while Plaintiffs touched on communications with several different vendors, a number of those vendors appear on the same communications and so I think that we -- you

know, perhaps Ms. Evans and I can communicate offline, but I'm hopeful that we could provide your Honor with fewer than 40 examples, just to respect the Court's time. So I just wanted to put that initially for the marketing documents.

And similarly for the business documents, we're happy to provide you with as many as you would like to look at, but I do think that a number of them, as reflected in their logged entries, are very similar. You know, there are certain communications with committees that are, you know, not identical necessarily but other-themed, shall we say, and you might not have to look at all of them. And so perhaps we could ease the Court's burden a bit by identifying those for the Court.

THE COURT: I'd really appreciate that. What it feels to me like what would make some sense is let's pick a deadline for the filing of a supplemental memorandum by both sides, with the Defendants having leave in advance to ask to have any portions of what they have to say that actually would reveal the content of something that's privileged, that would be redacted, so that I can understand what I'm looking at. And I think it would be very helpful for the Plaintiff to do the same thing. And between now and when you actually

make those submissions with the actual documents, if you guys could meet and confer to trim it down to a set; recognizing that what I'm giving you leave to submit is up to all of the 29 business communications, up to 10 family members related to the business communications, up to 20 chosen by the Plaintiffs, up to 20 chosen by the Defendants of the third party marketing consultant parents and then the associated family members that go with those, with the hope and expectation that the parties' meet and confer will reduce significantly what's actually submitted.

And then your supplemental briefs and the presentation will give me a really clear log entry by log entry what am I looking at, what does the log entry associated with this document actually say, so that I have no ambiguity to go from this is the log entry, here's the document; in the *in camera* set that I get from the Defendants they're together, and then a document by document, you know, whatever further argument either side would like to submit, including on the Plaintiffs' side to argue further that additional information regarding the identity or the relationship with the consultant who is involved in the communication is essential in order for the Court to make a determination as to whether one of these

exceptions to the basic third party rule applies.

So when should we set that deadline, recognizing that we're rocking into the holiday land. Two weeks?

MS. DYSON: Two weeks should be fine, your Honor.

MS. EVANS: That's fine, your Honor.

MS. DYSON: Your Honor, I have just a clarifying question. When you said so many marketing parents and their associated family members, I want to make sure I understand, and I apologize that I'm not clear on this.

You would like the associated family members with them or only a selection of family members?

THE COURT: I'd really prefer a selection of family members.

MS. DYSON: Okay.

THE COURT: I basically want, would like this to be as tight as possible, recognizing that the goal is that I want to give a really fair review. I've got to be able to understand what I'm looking at, understand what the privilege asserted is, why, if there's a third party why there's an exception, and what's the nature of the legal advice. You know, I'm not -- I've never worked in this particular industry, so the vocabulary, I might need some help with why a term is actually a legal term of art. If it is, I don't know, and so I

would be looking for help with that.

But to the extent that there are family members that are not interesting and not in issue and can be omitted, just let me know that there was something omitted and that it's for a good reason, and I won't worry about it; I'll be happy.

MS. EVANS: And I think Plaintiff can (unintelligible) on the family member, and we will certainly meet and confer about the other documents. However, we are somewhat in the dark even more than you will be after reviewing them *in camera*, and so I don't want to limit the number much further other than we'll discuss it and certainly, you know, speak with Ms. Dyson, figure ways that maybe don't put us in the dark.

But given there's been a lot of over-designation in this case, more than 5,000 entries that come off the logs, we want to make sure that you get to see and that we are able to provide you with the representative number, so we'll do our best.

THE COURT: Yes. I mean that's why I'm not placing tighter limits on you, because I recognize that you're, you know, your steering's aligned and the Defendants know what they've got. That's why I don't want to impose artificial limits. That said, the more

targeted what I receive, the better quality 1 2 decision-making you're going to get. 3 MS. DYSON: Understood. Thank you. 4 THE COURT: All right. A date in two weeks, 5 Okay. July 10, does that work for July 10th. 6 everybody? 7 MS. DYSON: Yes, your Honor. 8 MS. EVANS: Yes, your Honor. Okay. So on July 10 we'll see a 9 THE COURT: 10 filing from both sides in the form of supplemental The Defendants', doubtless, will be with a 11 memoranda. 12 motion to seal; and then I will receive presumably by 13 hand-delivery from I'm guessing Ms. Benjamin, who is 14 acting as local counsel for the Defendants, a set of 15 the documents arranged so that I don't have to guess 16 what log entry goes with what document, it's all very 17 very clear. 18 We will make it abundantly clear, MS. EVANS: 19 your Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 21 And I will try to rule as quickly as I can after -- I'm 22 not sure I'm going to need further argument. I'll see. 23 I'll look at the *in camera* review set very quickly and 24 you may get a decision; you may get a text order 25 decision; you may get a more worked-through decision;

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or you may get a notice for a hearing, depending on
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       what I see. Okay?
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                           Thank you.
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              MS. EVANS:
              THE COURT: Anything else?
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               (No response)
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              THE COURT: Court is in recess.
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              MS. EVANS: Not from the Plaintiff.
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CERTIFICATION I, Denise P. Veitch, RPR, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes from the official digital sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled case. /s/ Denise P. Veitch_ Denise P. Veitch, RPR <u>July 2, 2018</u> Date