DRAFT

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(The jury is present for the following)

THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen. I know you've been working very hard, and I thank you for the question that you've submitted. The question that you've asked is somewhat nuanced and complicated question so I'm going to do my best to try to give you a little bit of a clarification that will assist you in answering the questions that you have.

Now, I'm going to read your question for the record. The attorneys are aware that I've been discussing it with them. Your question is as follows: Please provide clarification about element five of the Pinkerton charge as it relates to Count VI of the charges against the Defendant, what is the legal definition of foreseen and does it include a specific time frame. We are stalling up on verbiage.

So, first, in order to answer your question, I am presupposing and in doing so reminding you of the remainder of the elements of the Pinkerton charge, that is to say that you don't get to the fifth element of the Pinkerton instruction unless you have gone through the first four elements of the Pinkerton instruction and found that each of those elements has been satisfied, so to reiterate, that someone committed the

substantive crime -- I'm stating this in terms of the presupposition so that I can answer your questions I think precisely, which is what you want, so that someone committed the crime charged in the count, and here we're talking about Count VI, that the person you find actually committed the substantive crime was a member of the conspiracy and that you found that -- the Defendant to be a member of this conspiracy and that a co-conspirator committed the substantive crime in furtherance of the conspiracy and that the Defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the substantive element was committed and had not withdrawn from it.

So those elements have to be satisfied until you get to the fifth element, which would require that the Defendant would have reasonably foreseen that one or more of his co-conspirators might have committed the crime. And of course that means with respect to Count VI that we're dealing with May 4th, 2012, which is the date on which Count VI is alleged to have occurred.

So first let me try to deal with your -- having set the stage for it, let me deal with your question about time frame. The time frame is not and would not be limited to May 4th, 2012. The time frame would be bounded only by what you have found the dates of the

conspiracy to be, up to and including May 4th, 2012. That would be the time frame during which you would be asking the question of whether it was reasonably foreseeable for the Defendant, reasonably to have foreseen that one of his co-conspirators might commit that substantive crime on May 4th, 2012. It's the time frame of the conspiracy up to and including May 4th, 2012, but not beyond 2012 for the obvious common sense reason that something that occurred after the commission of the crime, even if the conspiracy was still going, could not be evidence of something that would occur before the substantive crime.

Now, in terms of what you've asked with respect to the definition of foreseeability let me say the following. I've now tried to address the time frame issue. I'm now going to try to address your question with respect to the words reasonable foreseeability, what does that mean.

There must be, for you to find element five has been met, there must be some evidence from which you can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant foresaw the likelihood that the firearm would be possessed in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime or used, carried during or in relation to -- let me restate that. It has to track the language of the

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Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I suggest if you're

That there must be some evidence from which you can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant foresaw the likelihood that the firearm would be used or carried during or in relation to the crime or possessed in furtherance of the commission of that crime, that is, the drug trafficking crime, the narcotics transaction that allegedly occurred on May 4. 2012.

Now, when we speak of reasonable foreseeability, what we're saying is that the act must not be merely possible but probable. So in terms of foreseeability, we're talking about reasonable foreseeability and not some sort of prophetic vision as to what might happen in the future. So I hope that what I've given you is responsive to your questions, and of course if you have further questions, you can send out an additional note. But I'm going to return you to the jury room with that instruction and if you'd like, I will -- first of all, is that instruction satisfactory to counsel for the Government and counsel for the Defendant?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: It is to the Government, your Honor.

MR. CALCAGNI: Same with the Defendant, your

willing to do this, to have that portion of the transcript of what I just read to the jury printed and sent in to the jury room along with the other instructions. Is that agreeable to both?

MR. CALCAGNI: This Court is seeking to supplement the written product given to the jurors in that will be fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you agreeable with that?

MS. GOLDSTEIN: Yes. That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: So I'll do what I can to have what I just said to you printed up and sent in to you in case you want to refer back to that. So with that I'm going to return you to the jury room.

(The jury is not present for the following)
MS. GOLDSTEIN: Your Honor